## Information-Theoretic Security

## Probabilistic Cipher Model

2 idependent random variables: $X$ with range $R_{X}$ (the set of plaintexts), and $Z$ with range $R_{Z}$ (the key space).

No assumptions are made w.r.t. the probability distribution of $X$, however, we assume that $Z$ is uniformly distributed and independent of $X$.

The encryption function $E_{z}(x)=y$. The set of ciphertexts $Y$ is a projection of $X \times Z$ under an equivalence relation $\sim$ stating that $(a, b) \sim(c, d)$ whenever $E_{b}(a)=E_{d}(c)$. This projection forms a factor set that we will call $X Z$, and its corresponding range $R_{X Z}$.

## Information-Theoretic Security of a 1-bit XOR Cipher

In a 1 -bit XOR cipher, the set of plaintexts, the set of ciphertexts, and the set of keys is $\{0,1\}$ possible values that a bit can take. The encryption function $E_{z}(x)=x \oplus z$.

1-bit XOR cipher is information-theoretically secure, if the ciphertexts are independent of the plaintexts: $\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x \mid Y=y]=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x]$. This means that the ciphertext contains no information about the plaintext, and cannot leak it. Since

$$
\underset{X Z}{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x \mid Y=y]=\frac{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]}{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Y=y]},
$$

we need to calculate $\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Y=y]$, as well as $\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Y=y]=\sum_{x, z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Z=z][x \oplus z=y]=\sum_{x, z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z][x \oplus z=y] \\
& =\sum_{x} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \sum_{z} \underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z]}_{\text {constant }}[x \oplus z=y]=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z] \underbrace{\sum_{x} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x]}_{=1} \underbrace{\sum_{z}[x \oplus z=y]}_{=1} \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z]=\frac{1}{2} . \\
& \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]=\sum_{z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Z=z][x \oplus z=y]=\sum_{z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z][x \oplus z=y] \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \sum_{z} \underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z]}_{\text {constant }}[x \oplus z=y]=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x] \underbrace{\underset{X Z}{\operatorname{Pr}}[Z=z]}_{=\frac{1}{2}} \underbrace{\sum_{z}[x \oplus z=y]}_{=1} \\
& =\frac{1}{2} \underset{X Z}{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x] .
\end{aligned}
$$

The conditional probability of a plaintext given a ciphertext is

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x \mid Y=y]=\frac{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]}{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Y=y]}=\frac{\frac{1}{2} \underset{X Z}{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x]}{\frac{1}{2}}=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x],
$$

and therefore the 1-bit XOR cipher is information-theoretically secure.
Theorem 1. If $Z$ is independent of $X, Z$ is uniformly distributed and for every plaintext $x$ and for every ciphertext $y$ there is a unique key $z$ such that $E_{z}(x)=y$, then the cipher is unbreakable.

Proof. See lecture slides.
It is possible to show that in a 1-bit XOR cipher for every pair of plaintext $x$ and ciphertext $y$ there is a unique key $z$ such that $x \oplus z=y$.

XOR operation is identical to addition in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$. Therefore, we can encode the encryption function as $y=x \oplus z=x+z(\bmod 2)$. For every plaintext-ciphertext pair $(x, y)$ there is a key $z=y-x$ $(\bmod 2)$ such that $x+z=x+y-x=y$. To show that such $z$ is unique, assume there exists another key $z^{\prime} \neq z$ such that $x+z^{\prime}=y(\bmod 2)$. In other words,

$$
x+z=y=x+z^{\prime} \quad(\bmod 2) \Longrightarrow z-z^{\prime}=0 \quad(\bmod 2) \Longrightarrow z \equiv z^{\prime} \quad(\bmod 2) .
$$

Since for every plaintext-ciphertext pair $(x, y)$ there exists a unique key $z$, by Theorem 1 the 1 -bit XOR cipher cipher is information-theoretically secure.

## Information-Theoretic Security of a Shift Cipher

The encryption function of a shift cipher is $y=x+z(\bmod 26)$. Following the same reasoning as above, it is possible to show that for every plaintext-ciphertext pair $(x, y)$ there exists a unique key $z=y-x(\bmod 26)$. Hence, by Theorem 1 the shift cipher is information-theoretically secure.

## Inforation-Theoretic Security of a Substitution Cipher

A substitution cipher is a cipher, where the key is a permutation $\sigma$ which puts every plaintext $x$ into one-to-one correspondence with a unique ciphertext $y=\sigma(x)$. Since a permutation is a bijective map, it is invertible, and therefore any ciphertext can be decrypted into corresponding plaintext. Hence, the decryption identity holds $\sigma^{-1}(\sigma(x))=\left(\sigma^{-1} \circ \sigma\right)(x)=x$.

Since there are 26 letters in English alphabet, there are 26! possible permutations. If we fix one specific plaintext-ciphertext pair $\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right)$, then there exist 25 ! permutations of the remaining letters. In other words, for every plaintext-ciphertext pair $(x, y)$ there exist 25 ! unique keys $z$ such that $y=z(x)$. Therefore, we cannot prove information-theoretical security using Theorem 1 above.

Instead, we will show that $\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x \mid Y=y]=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x]$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Y=y] & =\sum_{x, z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Z=z][z: x \mapsto y]=\sum_{x, z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{Pr}}[Z=z][z: x \mapsto y] \\
& =\sum_{x} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{ra}}[X=x] \sum_{z} \underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z][z: x \mapsto y]=\underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{Pr}}[Z=z]}_{=\frac{1}{26!}} \underbrace{\sum_{x} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x]}_{=1} \underbrace{\sum_{z}^{\sum_{z}[z: x \mapsto y]}}_{=25!}}_{\text {constant }} \begin{aligned}
25!
\end{aligned} \\
& =\frac{25!}{26!}=\frac{1}{26} .
\end{aligned}
$$

This tells us that $Y$ is uniformly distributed.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]=\sum_{z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Z=z][z: x \mapsto y]=\sum_{z} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z][z: x \mapsto y] \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] \sum_{z} \underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z]}_{\text {constant }}[z: x \mapsto y]=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}^{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x] \underbrace{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[Z=z]}_{=\frac{1}{26!}} \underbrace{\sum_{z}[z: x \mapsto y]}_{=25!} \\
& =\frac{1}{26} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] . \\
& {\underset{X r}{X}}_{\operatorname{Pr}}[X=x \mid Y=y]=\frac{\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x, Y=y]}{\underset{X Z}{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y=y]}=\frac{\frac{1}{26} \operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x]}{\frac{1}{26}}=\operatorname{Pr}_{X Z}[X=x] .
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore, the substitution cipher is information-theoretically secure.

